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Ever since the publication of Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, there has been 
a raging debate in philosophy of language over whether meaning and thought are, in some sense, 
normative (Kripke 1982). Most participants in the normativity wars seem to agree that some uses 
of meaningful expressions and/or some sorts of thoughts are semantically correct while others are 
incorrect. What they mainly disagree over is whether this, by itself, entails anything normative, for 
example, that they are also semantically permissible or forbidden. Many philosophers have 
assumed or argued that it does (Boghossian 1989, Glock 2019, McGinn 1984, Millar 2002, 
Whiting 2007, 2009, 2016). Many others have argued that it doesn’t (Hattiangadi 2006, 2007, 
Glüer 2001, 2013, Glüer & Wikforss 2009, 2015, Wikforss 2001).  
  But what is it to say that a use of an expression or a thought is semantically correct? On 
the so-called orthodox construal, it is to say that it doesn’t amount to or result in a factual mistake, 
that is, in saying or thinking something false (Hattiangadi 2006, 2007, Whiting 2007, 2009, 2016). 
In slogan form: correctness consists in truth. This conception is usually taken to apply to both uses 
of meaningful expressions and certain sorts of thoughts and its putative normative consequences 
or lack thereof have been discussed to death (see e. g. Glüer & Wikforss 2015, 2018, Miller 2020, 
Whiting 2009). 
 However, there is also an alternative construal on which to say that a use of an expression 
is semantically correct is instead to say that it doesn’t result in a distinctively linguistic mistake, 
that is, in misusing the expression (Buleandra 2008, Dummett 1991, Glock 2019, McGinn 1984, 
Millar 2002, 2004, Moore 1954). In slogan form: correctness is accordance with meaning. This 
conception is supposed to primarily apply to uses of linguistic expressions and its putative 
normative consequences have not been as widely discussed.1  
 
1 Though see Burge 1979/2003 for a view on which it applies to both language and concept use, Millar 2004 for an 
attempt to extend it to concepts and Glüer & Wifkorss 2018 for discussion. 
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 It is entirely natural to think that these two construals of semantic correctness are simply 
about different things and not necessarily in competition with each other. Semantic correctness as 
consisting of truth is one thing, semantic correctness as accordance with meaning is another, and 
both should be discussed. However, perhaps surprisingly, this is not the common view. Instead, 
several philosophers who subscribe to the orthodox construal have argued that the alternative 
construal of correctness as use in accordance with meaning doesn’t make any sense, partly because 
there are no clear cases of linguistic mistakes (Whiting 2016, Wikforss 2001).  
 My aim in this paper is not to argue against the orthodox construal which I think is 
interesting and important in its own right, though of limited applicability in the case of language 
use. Instead, I want to develop and defend the idea that there is a distinctively linguistic notion of 
correctness as use in accordance with meaning and argue that there are clear cases of linguistic 
mistakes. I will do this in three steps. 
  First, since part of the resistance to the notion of linguistic correctness as use in accordance 
with meaning is that it is supposed to be unclear what this amounts to, I will explicate it in more 
detail. I’ll start by briefly discussing the orthodox construal, only to make clear that if we are 
interested a distinctively linguistic notion, one that derives from the nature of linguistic meaning 
itself, then this is not what we have in mind. This is because the orthodox construal applies to only 
acts or states that are governed by a norm of truth. However, at best, only uses of declarative 
sentences are governed by such a norm which means the orthodox construal only applies to them. 
Yet, if we’re after a distinctively linguistic sense of correctness then we’re interested in something 
that should apply to all relevant uses of all meaningful expressions. (Section 1) 
 Second, I’ll argue that the distinctively linguistic notion of correctness makes sense if 
pursued from what I will call the public language perspective. On this common-sensical and 
entirely familiar point of view that dominates contemporary philosophy of language, linguistic 
meanings belong to expression-types in public languages like English, Estonian, or Esperanto. I’ll 
argue that this notion of linguistic meaning can be usefully explicated in terms of what the 
expression is semantically for doing in the language, and that this idea can further be explained in 
terms of its having use-conditions. To use an expression in accordance with its meaning is just to 
use it while being in its use-conditions. In contrast to the orthodox construal, this notion applies to 
all relevant uses of all meaningful expressions. (Section 2) 
3 
 
Even given something like the above explication, the skeptics have insisted that the notion 
of use in accordance with meaning is problematic since there are no clear cases of linguistic 
mistakes. One standard suggestion is that uses by speakers who are mistaken about an expression’s 
meaning constitute misuses (Dummett 1986, Glock 2019, Millar 2002, 2004). It is sometimes 
objected that these should be rather reinterpreted as cases of speaking a different language or 
engaging in linguistic innovation. I will argue that once we distinguish between complete 
incompetence and being mistaken about meaning there is very little plausibility to the claim that 
these cases should be reinterpreted. The skeptics then claim that the appearance of a linguistic 
mistake is due to the presence of a desire to communicate or intentions to speak properly which 
are extrinsic to meaning and language (Bilgrami 1993, 2012, Whiting 2016, Wikforss 2001). I’ll 
argue that this interesting response depends on an implicit shift to a Davidsonian individualist 
perspective which denies the significance of public language and operates with a radically different 
notion of “meaning”. I will show that from the public language perspective, the relevant intentions 
are intrinsic to meaning and language. Absent such intentions there is no speaking a public 
language like English or Estonian. The upshot is that from the public language perspective from 
which the notion of linguistic correctness is pursued, uses by speakers who are mistaken about 
meaning constitute perfectly good cases of linguistic mistakes. (Section 3) 
 
1. The Orthodox Construal 
 
Part of the resistance to the notion of linguistic correctness as use in accordance with meaning is 
that it is supposed to be unclear what this amounts to. My aim in this first, preparatory section, is 
to briefly discuss the orthodox construal, only to make clear that if we are interested a distinctively 
linguistic notion then this is not what we have in mind. 
On the orthodox construal, to say that a use of an expression or a thought is semantically 
correct is to say that it doesn’t result in a factual mistake, that is, in saying or thinking something 
false. The paradigm cases here are the following. Suppose you apply a predicate like ‘is British’ 
to Gottlob, perhaps in using the declarative sentence ‘Gottlob is British’ with its meaning in 
English and saying that Gottlob is British. Then to say that your use was incorrect is just to say 
that you misapplied the predicate, applied it to something to which it doesn’t apply, and said 
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something false. Similarly, suppose you judged that Ludwig is German. Then to say that your 
judgment is incorrect is just to say that it is false. 
This sort of correctness applies to all acts or states that satisfy the following two conditions:  
 
(Content)  they have representational content and truth-conditions; and  
(Norm)  they are governed by a norm of truth (or one that entails truth, like 
knowledge) 
  
Hence, we can talk about this sort of correctness of judgments, beliefs, and certain sorts of uses of 
predicates and declarative sentences, e. g. to say things or make assertions. This can be called 
semantic correctness in the sense of ‘semantic’ in which the word is used to talk about 
representation and truth-conditions in general and not exclusively about linguistic meaning. 
Semantic correctness on this construal amounts to nothing more than representational correctness, 
satisfying the relevant norm of truth. 
It is paramount, in understanding this notion, that an act or state must have both of the 
above characteristics to be correctness-apt. Being characterized by Content alone doesn’t suffice. 
If we hypostasize representational contents into propositions, then we can of course say that they 
have truth-conditions and are true or false. But from this alone absolutely nothing follows about 
the correctness or incorrectness of uses of sentences or thoughts. When you perform the act of 
entertaining the proposition that Gottlob is British in the sense of simply calling it to mind you 
don’t do anything correct or incorrect no matter whether the proposition is true or false. This is 
because entertaining is a state that isn’t characterized by Norm. This in stark contrast with 
judgments and beliefs which are governed by a norm of truth or knowledge.  
 The orthodox construal captures a perfectly acceptable thing one can mean by ‘semantic 
correctness’. We might call it representational correctness. However, suppose you are interested 
in a distinctively linguistic notion of correctness, one that derives from the nature of linguistic 
meaning itself.2 Then you have in mind a quite different notion. This is not a new claim and the 
 
2 Right at the beginning of his discussion Kripke writes (my emphasis): 
 
I am confident, perhaps after checking my work, that 125 is the correct answer. It is correct both in the 
arithmetical sense that 125 is the sum of 68 and 57, and in the metalinguistic sense that ‘plus’, as I intended to 
use that word in the past, denoted a function which, when applied to the numbers called ‘68’ and ‘57’, yields the 
value 125. (Kripke 1982: 8) 
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standard reason given for it is that you can use a sentence linguistically correctly while still making 
a factual, representational mistake (Moore 1954: 308, see also Schroeder 2008). This is true, but I 
want to make the point a bit differently. Let’s start from the fact that if you thought that there is a 
distinctively linguistic notion of correctness then, since it’s supposed to derive from the nature of 
linguistic meaning, it should apply to all relevant uses of all meaningful expressions.3 But then it’s 
easy to see that you must have something else in mind than representational correctness because 
that applies at best only to uses of declarative sentences since only these are governed by a norm 
of truth.  
 To see why, compare the following five sentences in different moods: 
 
1) ‘Bertrand is British’ 
2) ‘Is Bertrand British?’ 
3) ‘What time is it?’ 
4) ‘Read the paper!’ 
5) ‘Ouch!’ 
 
At best, only 1) can be used to say something and is thereby governed by a norm of truth. In 
contrast, 2) and 3) are used to ask questions. Acts of asking questions are not governed by a norm 
 
 
In this passage the arithmetical sense of correctness is the factual sense of correctness and the “metalinguistic” sense 
is the distinctively linguistic sense. This becomes clearer if we consider what Kripke would say about his other 
example of using ‘table’ to talk about tables and not tabairs (where a tabair is anything that is a table not found at the 
base of the Eiffel tower, or a chair found there). If you apply ‘table’ to a table found at the base of the Eiffel tower 
then your use is correct both in the factual sense that the thing is a table, and also in the “metalinguistic” sense that 
in your idiolect, ‘table’ is for talking about tables and not tabairs.  
Things are complicated here by the fact that Kripke seems to think that the “metalinguistic” sense is 
dependent on past intentions to use words with particular meanings. One reason for this might be that Kripke is 
presupposing a substantive view about what it is for an expression to have a meaning in a speaker’s idiolect to the 
effect that it has to do with past intentions to use words to talk about particular things (see Bilgrami’s discussion of 
this as one way to intrerpret Kripke in Bilgrami 1993). Then to use an expression in accordance with its meaning at 
a time is to use it in accordance with one’s past intentions. However, another thing that might be going on is that the 
talk of past intentions is a quirk due to Kripke’s initial presentation of the skeptic’s doubts as being about one’s past 
use that is later done away with (see the discussion first on p. 12 and then on p. 21). This deserves further discussion 
elsewhere. 
 
3 I add the hedge ‘relevant’ since the notion of ‘use’ of an expression is itself ambiguous between what I call mere 
uses, any productions of tokens or what Austin called phonetic acts, and uses with meaning or productions of tokens 
while also “activating” the meaning or what Austin called rhetic acts (Austin 1962). Clearly only the latter are of 




of truth. And even though they have answerhood-conditions, they’re not correct or incorrect 
dependent on receiving an answer. Similarly, 4) is used to tell someone to do something. Acts of 
telling someone to do something are not governed by a norm of truth either. And even though they 
have fulfilment-conditions, they’re not themselves correct or incorrect depending on being 
fulfilled. Finally, 5) is used to express pain and such acts are clearly not governed by a norm of 
truth nor do they involve any sorts of satisfaction-conditions. Can 2)-5) still be linguistically 
misused? It’s natural to think that they can, but the orthodox construal can’t capture this.4 
To sum up, there’s absolutely nothing wrong in using ‘semantic correctness’ to talk about 
representational correctness, asking whether this entails anything normative and doing it under the 
rubric of ‘normativity of meaning’. However, it should be also clear that those who think there’s 
a distinctively linguistic notion of correctness have something very different in mind. 
 
2. Linguistic Correctness 
 
On the alternative construal, to say that a use is semantically correct is to say that it doesn’t result 
in a distinctively linguistic mistake, that is, in misusing the expression. In other words, it is to say 
that it is used in accordance with the expression’s meaning (McGinn 1984, Millar 2002, 2004). 
Part of the resistance to this notion consists in the claim that it is unclear what this amounts to (e. 
g. see the discussion of McGinn’s and Millar’s explications in Wikforss 2001: 210-211 and 
Whiting 2016: 227-229). Thus, our first task is to arrive at a clear conception of what this means. 
 The notion of linguistic correctness as use in accordance with meaning makes sense if 
pursued from what I call the public language perspective. This is a common-sensical and entirely 
familiar point of view which clearly dominates contemporary philosophy of language and is 
common to philosophers otherwise as different as Burge, Brandom, Dummett, Evans, Kaplan, 
Lewis, Millikan, McDowell, Kripke, Perry, Recanati, Searle, Soames, Stalnaker etc., the main two 
outliers being Chomsky and later Davidson. Its essence can be captured with the following 
 
4 I added the hedge ‘at best’ above since some people think that the notion of representational correctness doesn’t 
even apply to all uses of declarative sentences, but only uses of them to make assertions. For example, Jeff Speaks 
has argued that if you used ‘Bertrand is German’ while making a joke, then, even though you would say something 
false, you wouldn’t intuitively use it incorrectly (Speaks 2009: 410-411). It is only if you used ‘Bertrand is German’ 
while making a genuine assertion that you would use it incorrectly. This would entail that, even declarative 
sentences by themselves are not semantically governed by a norm of truth. However, this is a separate debate having 




statement: linguistic meanings belong to expression-types in public languages like English, 
Estonian, or Esperanto. We can elaborate on this as follows: 
 
1. Types: The primary units of importance are expressions qua types and not their individual 
uses on particular occasions. 
 
2. Meaning: An expression’s linguistic meaning in a language is what competent speakers of 
the language have a grasp of. It is what makes it possible for them to use the expression to 
speak that language. It is what language-learners aim to grasp. It is a standing, stable, 
context-invariant property of the expression. 
 
3. Language: Languages like English, Estonian, or Esperanto are some sorts of public, 
communal, or, minimally, shared entities, sociolects rather than idiolects. For example, 
philosophers from Dummett to Burge to Kaplan would think of them as historically 
embedded, ongoing, rule-governed social practices (Dummett 1991: Ch. 4, Jackman 1999, 
Ridge 2020). However, one could think of them also in a somewhat more local and 
temporary manner (e. g. see Armstrong 2016). 
 
This perspective constitutes a core take on the phenomena of meaning and language while being 
compatible with different ways of spelling out the details.5  
 The relevant notion of linguistic meaning can be usefully explicated in terms of what the 
expression is semantically for doing in the language. What an expression is semantically for doing 
in the particular language is what its meaning enables us to use it to do, such that we couldn’t use 
meaningless expressions or expressions which have a different meaning to do these things.6 For 
 
5 Two comments. First, I said above that one of the outliers is Davidson. Of course, Davidson does think meaning 
itself is public in that there can’t be nothing more to it than is available to the radical interpreter, in other words, that 
it can’t outrun publicly available evidence for it (e. g. see Davidson 2005: 55, Glüer 2011: 24-26, 2013: 340). But 
that’s publicity about meaning and not language, and in quite a different sense of ‘public’. 
 Second, a public language in the relevant sense can be a very minimal thing, for example, a local and 
temporary code established between two people. All that is required is that the expression-types of this code have 
meaning in the relevant sense and that the code is shared in the relevant sense. Thanks to two different anonymous 
referees for asking me to comment on these points. 
 
6 Francois Recanati and Scott Soames have used something like this intuitive notion of “semantically for” in providing 
their favored theory of demonstratives on which ‘this’ is for talking about or referring to something proximal, ‘he’ for 
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example, names and other referential expressions are plausibly for talking about particular people 
and objects while predicates are for expressing properties. For example, it is widely assumed that 
in English ‘Bertrand’ is for talking about some specific person, ‘I’ is for talking about oneself, and 
‘is British’ is for expressing the property of being British. Moving to sentences, declaratives are 
for saying things, interrogatives for asking questions, imperatives for telling people to do things, 
and expressives for expressing one’s mental states.  
 It is a short step from the idea that expressions are semantically for doing certain things to 
the idea that expressions have conditions of correct use or use-conditions. For example, and please 
treat these just as illustrative, ‘Bertrand’ is perhaps for using while you’re thinking or referring to 
Bertrand and thus its use-conditions are that one has to be performing these mental acts (Hanks 
2015, Soames 2010b). Similarly, ‘I’ is for using while you’re thinking of yourself in a first-
personal or de se way, and ‘is British’ while you’re thinking of the property of being British. 
Finally, a declarative sentence like ‘Bertrand is British’ is for using when one is doing the above 
acts and further predicating the property of the person, resulting in your entertaining the 
proposition that Bertrand is British (Soames), or judging it to be the case (Hanks). To take a 
different sort of example, the expressive interjection ‘Ouch!’ is for using while you’re in pain 
whereas ‘Oops!’ is for using when you’ve just observed a minor mishap (Kaplan MS). Finally, 
situational terms like ‘Hello!’ or ‘Goodbye!’ might be for using while you’re meeting someone or 
parting from them etc. 
 Given this this understanding, the most straightforward gloss on the notion of use in 
accordance with meaning is as follows:  
 
Linguistic Correctness:  To use an expression in accordance with its meaning is to use it 
while being in its use-conditions.  
 
 
talking about or referring to something that is male etc. (Recanati 2001, Soames 2010a). Note that the idea is not that 
we analyze the meaning of an expression in terms of what it is semantically for doing in the sense in which the 
analysans needs to be antecedently understood. Rather, the idea is that talking about what an expression is semantically 
for is a useful way of talking about its meaning that relates it to its use. Thanks to an anonymous referee for asking 
me to clarify this. 
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I think that this amounts to a perfectly clear explication of the notion and fits the bill in applying 
to all relevant uses of all meaningful expressions.7  
Now, even given something like the above explication, the skeptics have claimed that the 
notion is still problematic since there are no clear cases of linguistic mistakes. In the next section 
I will argue that there are. 
 
3. Mistakes about Meaning 
 
It is a standard suggestion that uses by speakers who are mistaken about an expression’s meaning 
constitute misuses (Dummett 1986, 1994: 265, Glock 2019: 302-303, Millar 2004: 162-164, 
Moore 1954: 309). Consider Millar: 
 
If, though I aspire to use a word in keeping with its received meaning, I am wrong about its 
received meaning, then I may misuse it. If I thought ‘arcane’ meant ancient then I would be 
liable to use the word as if that is what it meant. (Millar 2004: 162) 
 
Let’s add some non-predicate examples. Imagine a student who mistakenly thinks that ‘Bertrand’ 
is Gottlob’s name, confusing the two philosophers. Suppose further that she tries to use ‘Bertrand’ 
to talk about Gottlob on a particular occasion, namely, by using it and thinking of Gottlob. If you 
would ask her who she’s talking about she’d tell you that she’s talking about the German guy, 
inventor of modern logic and so forth. The suggestion is that she’s used ‘Bertrand’ incorrectly 
because ‘Bertrand’ is for talking about Bertrand, and not about Gottlob. 
 To take another example, consider a variant of the story of the cyclops Polyphemus from 
Homer’s Odyssey on which he is mistaken about the fact that ‘I’ is for talking about oneself 
 
7 Notice that the notion of use-conditions is compatible with both normativist and anti-normativist construals of what 
it is for an expression to have use-conditions in a public, communal, or shared language. Of course, traditionally the 
most salient view has been that it is for the expression to be governed by a constitutive rule of use that tells us in which 
conditions it can be permissibly used (Alston 2000, Dummett 1991, Reiland 2020, Searle 1969, Stenius 1967). On this 
conception, conditions of correct use = conditions of permissible use. However, a Lewis-influenced conventionalist 
could argue that for an expression to have use-conditions is instead for the expression to be regularly and 
conventionally used in these conditions. Similarly, a Davidson-influenced dispositionalist who thinks there is a role 
for shared languages could argue that it is for the speakers of the language to have overlapping dispositions to use the 




because he thinks that it is Odysseus’s name.8 Suppose he uses ‘I’ while trying to talk about 
Odysseus, namely, by using it and thinking of Odysseus in screaming ‘I did it’ as a response to the 
question who blinded him. If you would’ve asked him to point to who he was talking about he 
would’ve pointed to Odysseus. The suggestion is that Polyphemus has used ‘I’ semantically 
incorrectly because ‘I’ is for talking about oneself, and not about others. 
To take a final and in many ways the simplest example, suppose you’re going for a trip to 
Tallinn and I teach you the Estonian words for ‘Hello!’ and ‘Goodbye!’, ‘Tere!’ and ‘Nägemist!’. 
However, you misunderstand or misremember and come away thinking that ‘Nägemist’ means 
‘Hello!’ not ‘Goodbye!’. You then go on to use the expression while meeting your hosts, wanting 
to greet them. The suggestion is that you would be misusing it because ‘Nägemist!’ is for using on 
parting and not on meeting. 
 It’s natural to think that in all of the above cases one is making a linguistic mistake. Skeptics 
like Daniel Whiting disagree: 
  
...if I use a word which in English signifies the colour red to signify or speak of the colour 
blue, it hardly follows that I have made a mistake – perhaps I am speaking some variant 
of English, or have introduced a linguistic innovation, or am speaking a different 
language. (Whiting 2016: 230). 
 
The idea seems to be that we don’t have to think of the speakers in the above cases as using the 
relevant expressions while lacking a grip on their use-conditions, rather we could reinterpret them 
as speaking a different language or engaging in linguistic innovation. 
 There is something to Whiting’s suggestion, but we have to look at the cases in more detail 
and one by one (compare Burge 2003: 118-119). The issues here are complicated by the fact that 
‘use’ is crucially ambiguous. In the most basic sense, to use a word is just to produce a token of it 
by uttering or inscribing it.  Meaning need not be involved at all. In Austin’s terms, such mere uses 
result in phonetic acts. This can be compared with merely moving chess pieces around on the board 
when enacting a play for the kids, say. Rules of chess need not be involved at all. However, for 
our purposes the relevant sorts of uses are what I like to call uses with meaning (compare Kaplan 
1989: 602). In Austin’s terms, such uses result in rhetic or locutionary acts. These can be compared 
 
8 In the actual story he was mistaken about the meaning of ‘Nobody’ by thinking that it was Odysseus’s name. 
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with moving a chess piece to make a move in the game.9 It should be obvious that only the second 
sorts of uses can result in linguistically correct or incorrect uses. 
Now, completely incompetent speakers, those who have no grip on the expression’s 
meaning nor even any thoughts about what it might be, can’t even try to use an expression with its 
meaning. For example, suppose I teach you how to pronounce the Estonian sentence: ‘Lumi on 
valge’ without telling you what it means (and suppose you also don’t form any hypothesis about 
what it means). It should be clear that in such a situation you can’t even try to use it with its 
meaning, try to speak Estonian (compare Austin 1962: 97, Burge 2003a: 118). If you’d utter the 
sentence then perhaps we should indeed reinterpret you as innovating or speaking a different 
language.10 
But our cases are not cases of complete incompetence, but of being mistaken about the 
meaning. I teach you to say ‘Nägemist!’, but you misunderstand or misremember what it means. 
Is your predicament like complete incompetence in that you can’t even try to speak Estonian? No. 
It’s natural to think that in such a situation you can at least try to speak Estonian. You do that by 
using the sentence with the intentions to participate in the practice. Your use thereby goes beyond 
 
9 Austin thought that a phonetic act is an act of making certain noises (or scribbling down marks) whereas a phatic act 
is an act of making noises where those noises belong to a language with a grammar and where the noises are made as 
belonging to the language. A parrot can perform phonetic, but not phatic acts. Furthermore, a rhetic act is an act of 
making certain noises where those noises belong to a language and where the noises are made as belonging to the 
language and with their meaning and while fixing their reference. As we will see, a semantically incompetent speaker 
can perform phonetic, but not rhetic acts. (Austin 1962: 92-98, for discussion see Ball 2020). Mere uses result in either 
phonetic or phatic acts, whereas uses with meaning of at least whole sentences result in rhetic acts. 
 
10 The above distinction bears on different sorts of cases that are mentioned by Millar as an example of misuses, 
slips of the tongue: 
 
I might say ‘That tree is an oak’, but my use of the word ‘oak’ is a slip of the tongue—I meant to say ‘beech’. 
Here I apply the term ‘oak’ to a certain tree picked out demonstratively. My application of ‘oak’ to the tree may 
well be incorrect in the sense of being false. But however that may be, it is certainly incorrect in that it is a 
misuse—a use that is not in keeping with the relevant meaning of the term. This meaning dictates that, when 
applied to something, the word ascribes the property of being an oak. It is not in question that I said of the tree 
that it is an oak, for what I said is fixed in part by the relevant meaning of the term ‘oak’. So I have ascribed to 
the tree the property of being an oak. But what I said is not what I meant to say. The word is not a suitable word 
for ascribing the property I meant to ascribe—that of being a beech. (Millar 2004: 163). 
 
Millar seems to say that insofar as you uttered ‘oak’, your use was a misuse. However, in the light of the above 
distinction I think the right thing to say about such a case is that you tried to use ‘beech’ with its meaning, but due to 
some performance interference, you failed to produce a token of that word and produced a token of another word, 
‘oak’. However, as far as the token of the word you produced, ‘oak’, you didn’t even try to use this one with its 
meaning. Thus, contrary to what Millar says, you didn’t plausibly say of the tree that it is an oak and hence you 




a mere use and is a use with meaning, and if you’re not in the use-conditions then you count as 
misusing the expression. And in this case there seem to be no independent reasons to reinterpret 
you as not trying to speak Estonian but engaging in linguistic innovation or speaking a different 
language. That is clearly not what you yourself think you’re doing! Similarly, it’s hard to see what 
reasons there are to think that speakers who are mistaken about what ‘arcane’ means, whose name 
‘Bertrand’ is, and what ‘I’ is for talking about, should be reinterpreted. After all, what the speakers 
actually do in such cases if their error is pointed out to them is simply adjust their understanding 
and usage (Burge 2003: 131, compare Dummett 1986: 462).  
 There is a standard response to this which was first forcefully made by Bilgrami: 
 
What sense of norm, then, do I accept? It emerges form the fact that individuals intend to speak 
like others in the community speak and they intend to speak as they have in the past rather than 
waywardly. This means that individuals do intend to speak in a way that is natural to describe 
as, and that they themselves describe as, correctly. … we have a norm that is perfectly sensitive 
to the social linguistic practices that surround an individual. But the pragmatic explanations 
underlying the norm make it clear that it is … an extrinsic norm. It says “Speak like others do, 
if it pays to do so”. Or more specifically it might say “I ought to use words as others do, if I 
want to be easily understood.” (Bilgrami 1993: 134-135, compare Davidson 1992: 261, 1994: 
9, Wikforss 2001: 211) 
 
The basic idea behind the rejoinder is that the appearance that the above cases constitute misuses 
and the reasons why we adjust our understanding and usage are due to the presence of intentions 
to speak like others do. Such intentions are extrinsic to language and meaning. As applied to our 
central case of ‘Nägemist!’, you have a desire to be understood and an intention to speak like others 
do, and it is only because of these extrinsic factors that your use while not being in the use-
conditions counts as some sort of a mistake. But it’s not a linguistic mistake or misuse in the 
relevant sense.11 
 
11 An interesting and unappreciated aspect of Bilgrami’s discussion is that he clearly seems to think, contrary to later 
anti-normativists like Hattiangadi, Glüer, Wikforss etc. that the sense of linguistic correctness and incorrectness in 
play in the context of issues discussed by not only Burge, but also Kripke is not the orthodox one of saying 




Similarly, consider how Whiting continues the passage I quoted above: 
 
Of course, if I’m intending to speak (‘proper’) English, then I am making a mistake insofar as 
I am failing to execute my intention. But any norm that would deliver the verdict that such a 
mistake has been made would, once more, be instrumental. (Whiting 2016: 230) 
 
Like Bilgrami, Whiting seems to say that the appearance that the above cases constitute misuses 
depends on the presence of intentions to speak “properly”. Again, such intentions are extrinsic to 
language and meaning. As applied to our case of ‘Nägemist!’, you have an intention to speak 
“proper” Estonian and that’s why your use while not being in the use-conditions counts as a 
mistake. 
I must confess that it took me years to understand this line of thought. I finally got it when 
I realized that it relies on an implicit rejection of the public language perspective and subscription 
to the Davidsonian individualist persrpective which denies the significance of public language and 
operates with a different notion of “meaning”. Let me elaborate. 
 The rejoinder relies on the Davidsonian view that we have an independent power to imbue 
our uses of words with “meaning” by using them with meaning-intentions (see Davidson 1986, 
Bilgrami 1993: 142, Bilgrami 2012: 113,  for useful discussion see Glüer 2011: Ch. 2, Glüer 2013: 
341-342, also Camp 2013). From this point of view, the primary units of importance are particular 
uses of expressions, that is, token utterances and inscriptions. The role of intention is to imbue 
these particular uses with “meaning” on that occasion (Glüer) or context-locally (Camp). Thus, 
when we use an expression, we can choose to imbue the particular use with the same “meaning” 
that it has in the shared “language”, understood in terms of an overlap in dispositions to use, or 
with a different “meaning”. This depends on whether we have a further desire or intention to speak 
like others do or “properly”. On this view, what happens when you utter ‘Nägemist!’ in our case 
 
I’m certainly not going to deny that we sometimes misperceive things or that we have other similar kinds of 
false beliefs. And no doubt when we do these amount to some kind of failure or wrong. But to think of it as the 
sort of failure that Kripke’s discussion of normativity centrally demanded seems to me to be changing Kripke’s 
subject (and McDowell’s and mine) altogether.” (Bilgrami 1993: 43, for an even more explicit discussion, see 
Bilgrami 2012: 101-102).  
 
Thus, in contrast to later anti-normativists, Bilgrami straightforwardly denies that there is a language-intrinsic notion 
of correctness of use. I tend to think that this is a much better way for anti-normativists to think about their view 
rather than granting the notion of correctness of use but arguing that correctness doesn’t entail normativity (compare 
also Kaplan 2020). 
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is that you imbue your utterance with a “meaning” to the effect that you are greeting your hosts. 
But then the utterance by itself doesn’t constitute a mistake. It only constitutes a mistake given an 
extra, optional desire or intention to speak like others do (Bilgrami) or “properly” (Whiting). From 
such a Davidsonian perspective there is no need for the notion of a distinctively linguistic mistake, 
one that derives from the nature of linguistic meaning itself, nor is there any room for it since 
“meaning” is a one-off property of uses. 
 From the public language perspective this gets things completely backwards. First, those 
who subscribe to this perspective balk at the idea that we have an independent power to imbue our 
uses of words with meaning.12 At best, one can use words while having things in mind or speaker 
mean things a la Grice. Second, as was emphasized above, on this picture the primary units of 
importance are expressions thought of as types and not particular uses. It is these that have 
linguistic meanings in languages like English or Estonian. The role of intention is not to imbue the 
use with meaning, but to make it the case that the use is a use of the expression-type which has a 
meaning and thereby activate the meaning that is already there (compare, again, Kaplan 1989: 
602). In other words, when we use an expression we can either merely use it or try to use it with 
its meaning in the particular language and thereby participate in the relevant practice (compare 
Reimer 2004: 328-329). What happens when you utter ‘Nägemist’ in our case is that you try to 
speak Estonian and try to use the sentence with its meaning. Your use thereby goes beyond a mere 
use and is a use with meaning, but since you’re mistaken about what the meaning is, you do so 
while not being in the use-conditions and thereby count as misusing it. The crucial role is played 
 
12 Here are two examples. First, Lewis considers something like the Davidsonian idea of imbuing words with 
meaning in his “Languages and Language” by considering the proposal that instead of conventions of truthfulness 
and trust we could have conventions of  “bestowing a meaning” and simply dismisses it by saying that there is no 
such action as bestowing a meaning (Lewis 1975: 22-23).   
 Second, Dummett attributes such a view not only to Davidson (see Dummett 1986: 471), but also to 
Husserl, and criticizes it as follows (my emphasis): 
 
It in effect presupposes Humpty Dumpty's theory, that a word, as uttered on a particular occasion, bears 
whatever meaning it does because the speaker invests it with that meaning. It may be added that, if a large 
number of people invest it with the same meaning, the fact will come to be widely known that that is what an 
utterance of it usually means, and that in consequence that meaning will accrue to it as a word of the common 
language. But, on the contrary, a word of a language does not bear the meaning that it does because a 
large number of people have chosen to confer that meaning upon it; they use it as having that meaning 
because that is the meaning it has in the language. … It is only from learning language that anyone acquires 
the very conception of a word's having a meaning. We do not have meanings in our heads waiting for us to 
attach them to words, whether of the common language or of our own invention; we learn the practice of 
speaking a language … the fundamental concept is not that of the private meaning-conferring act, but of 
the social practice of using language. (Dummett 1993: 47, compare Kaplan 1989: 602) 
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by the intention to use the expression with its meaning in Estonian, and this intention is 
intrinsically related to language and meaning. Absent such intentions there is no speaking a public 
language. But once we have this intention in place, no further extrinsic desire or intention to speak 
like others do or “properly” is relevant or required to deliver the verdict that the above use is a 
misuse. 
Let’s sum up. The skeptics claimed that the notion of linguistic correctness is problematic 
since there are no clear cases of linguistic mistakes. I have discussed the standard suggestion that 
uses by speakers who are mistaken about an expression’s meaning are misuses. It is sometimes 
objected that these should be rather reinterpreted as cases of speaking a different language or 
engaging in linguistic innovation. I’ve argued that once we distinguish between complete 
incompetence and being mistaken about meaning there is very little plausibility to the claim that 
these cases should be reinterpreted. The skeptics then claim that the appearance of a linguistic 
mistake is due to the presence of a desire to communicate or intentions to speak properly which 
are extrinsic to meaning and language. I have argued that this depends on an implicit shift to a 
Davidsonian individualist perspective which denies the significance of public language and 
operates with a radically different notion of “meaning”. And I have argued that from the public 
language perspective the relevant intentions are intrinsic to meaning and language. 
One might wonder whether this doesn’t ultimately show that the viability of the notion of 
distinctively linguistic correctness as use with accordance to meaning depends on whether the 
public language vs. Davidsonian individualist perspective is correct. Quite so! The problem is that 
this is not at all how the dialectic is generally presented in the literature. Those skeptical of 
linguistic correctness tend to make it seem like there are no clear cases of linguistic mistakes, no 
matter one’s background perspective.13 This is emphatically not the case and the notions of public 
language, linguistic correctness, and linguistic mistake form a package deal. If one wants to call 
the latter into question one should tackle the public language perspective head on. In sum, from 
the public language perspective from which the notion of linguistic correctness is pursued, uses by 
speakers who are mistaken about meaning constitute perfectly good cases of linguistic mistakes.14 
 
13 While with Bilgrami the reliance on the Davidsonian background picture is explicit and with Wikforss it’s still 
visible, with many other skeptics like Whiting it goes unnoticed or at least unacknowledged. For example, Whiting 
seems to think that his arguments make also sense on the public language picture (Whiting 2016: 219fn). 
  
14 These are not the only cases of linguistic mistakes. On certain plausible assumptions about their meanings, we can 






Where does this leave the debate over normativity? Is it plausible, on this construal of linguistic 
correctness, that correct uses are also, in some sense, permissible? As I said above (see fn. 7), 
thinking of meaning in terms of use-conditions is by itself compatible with both normative and 
non-normative construals. One can think of it in terms of rules of use and permissibility, but also 
in terms of conventional regularities in use or overlap in dispositions to use. Of course, the people 
coming from the public language perspective like Burge, Dummett, Kaplan, Searle etc. have most 
frequently thought of them in terms of rules of use. That seems to suggest that for the concept of 
linguistic meaning that has been under discussion, normativism is relatively plausible. However, 
ultimately, this will depend on which of the three indicated ways of thinking about it is best, and 
this can only be settled by weighing the costs and benefits of the three packages as wholes. 
 Be that as it may, it is important to understand that even if linguistic meaning is normative, 
it would be normative only in the way that law, etiquette, and games are. In Derek Parfit’s terms, 
the notion of normativity in play here is that of rules and not of (authoritative, genuine) reasons – 
what more recently has come to be called formal versus authoritative normativity (Baker 2017, 
Finlay 2019: 204-208 Parfit 2011: 144-146). This sort of normativity doesn’t by itself give 
authoritative or genuine reasons like morality. But the thesis of normativity of meaning is therefore 
no less interesting. Even formal normativity sets strong constraints on theories of meaning. To 
come back full circle to Kripke’s discussion, it seems to rule out dispositionalism all by itself.15 
 
in pain then one can use ‘Ouch!’ with its meaning while not being in pain and thereby intentionally deceive one’s 
audience. This would be an intentional linguistic mistake comparable to an intentional foul in sport. Furthermore, 
consider the idea that slurs like ‘queer’ can and have been reappropriated which has caused the derogatory part to 
evaporate. The process of reappropriation plausibly involves intentional linguistic mistakes as well since in the 
process one uses the expressions with their meaning while not being in their use-conditions that require having the 
derogatory attitudes (for discussion, see Gray & Lennertz 2020). For considerations of space, I will leave discussion 
of such intentional mistakes for another time. 
 
15 Some participants in the normativity wars seem to think that the only interesting thesis of normativity of meaning 
is one which would automatically conflict with naturalism. For example, consider Hattiangadi’s take on the debate. 
She distinguishes between what she calls ‘norm-relativity’ and ‘genuine normativity’ and would say that the sort of 
normativity characteristic of law, etiquette, games etc. is mere norm-relativity. But it is only genuine normativity that 
is supposed to provide problems for naturalistic reduction and bears on solving the “hard problem of intentionality”. 
However, she thinks that neither meaning nor content is genuinely normative and thus the issue has no bearing on the 
hard problem (Hattiangadi 2017).  
My take on the debate is diametrically opposed as far as terminology, but I agree in almost all of the 
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